Mindfulness and the psychology of ethical dogmatism by Mattes, Josef
Journal of Buddhist Ethics 
ISSN 1076-9005 
http://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/ 














Copyright Notice: Digital copies of this work may be made and distributed 
provided no change is made and no alteration is made to the content. 
Reproduction in any other format, with the exception of a single copy 
for private study, requires the written permission of the author. All en-













Motivated by recent controversies concerning the rela-
tionship between modern mindfulness-based interven-
tions and Buddhism, this article discusses the relationship 
between mindfulness and dogmatism in general, and 
dogmatism in ethics in particular. The point of view taken 
is primarily that of the psychology of judgment and deci-
sion making: Various cognitive illusions affect the feelings 
of righteousness and certainty that tend to accompany 
ethical and moral judgments. I argue that even though 
there is some evidence that mindfulness practice im-
proves judgment and decision making, this improvement 
is rarely as strong as is implied in various contributions to 
the above-mentioned controversies. In addition, I reflect 
on claims that “the original teachings of the Buddha” jus-
tify the moral stances taken. I argue that these stances 
likely arise, at least in part, due to the cultural transmis-
                                               
1 Universität Wien. Email: josef.mattes@univie.ac.at. 
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sion of cognitive dissonance of early Christianity rather 
than being inherent in the Buddha’s teachings. 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation  
Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) and other modern Mindful-
ness Based Interventions (MBIs) are successful in alleviating suffering 
and are increasingly recognized as useful in other contexts as well (for 
example, Khoury et al., Rinske et al.; Bühlmayer et al.). This success holds 
even after concerns about possibly biased reporting of outcomes (Coro-
nado-Montoya et al.) are taken into account (Mattes). Despite this suc-
cess, these applications of mindfulness have recently been criticized for 
what these critics perceive as a lack of moral dimensions, and for what 
they claim to constitute cultural appropriation of Buddhist concepts. For 
a brief, critical overview of such criticisms, see Repetti. 
A prominent recent commentary “Too Early to Tell,” (Kabat-Zinn) 
answered these criticisms by observing that “we consider what we teach 
in MBSR . . . to be ‘wise’ or ‘right’ mindfulness, to whatever degree we 
manage to embody and convey it, and keep it in the forefront of our 
awareness” (Kabat-Zinn 1130) and further stated that MBSR “has always 
been anchored in the ethical framework that lies at the very heart of the 
original teachings of the Buddha” (1125). The commentary also ex-
pressed that we should “value, if not celebrate, both commonality and 
difference in pluralistic societies” (1126). 
 Nevertheless, this sentiment apparently does not always apply: 
“Trump and the . . . values he represents” (1129) are not valued, let alone 
celebrated (without spelling out what those values are believed to be), 
nor is the democratic decision of the United Kingdom to leave the Euro-
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pean Union. 2 I will not comment on another country’s president, but in 
elitist Brexit discussions many seem to conveniently have forgotten that 
little more than a decade ago the EU politicians planned to introduce a 
constitution that needed plebiscites in the member countries to go into 
force. This constitution was voted down in the first two countries where 
plebiscites were held—politicians simply rechristened the constitution a 
“treaty” after some cosmetic changes and put it into force without ask-
ing the people (Wikipedia). Not only that, even treatises are not worth 
much in the EU: Another widely ignored “detail” is that (by one count) 
there have been more than hundred breaches of the fundamental con-
tracts of the EU, going back at least to Germany and France in 2003. One 
more example: Recently, a member country of the EU started criminal 
proceedings against the former head of its statistics agency for accurate-
ly (!) reporting government finances (see, for example, Piller). You may 
or may not agree that these and similar issues are sufficient reasons for 
the UK to leave the EU, but using the Brexit as a paradigmatic example 
for the world supposedly being “increasingly dystopian” seems to me to 
be a rather peculiar way of embodying mindfulness and wisdom (let 
alone compassion).3  
                                               
2 There are, of course, people who value Trump and/or the Brexit. What is relevant for 
the present paper is to what extent those people who claim to value difference in plu-
ralistic societies (which in my experience includes everyone in the mindfulness com-
munity) actually do apply this sentiment to those with opinions different from theirs, 
or to democratic decisions that they dislike. See also footnote 7. 
3 This is not the only such example in that article; here are two more. There is talk of 
“wars” around pipeline building in the USA (Kabat-Zinn 1129), which makes me I won-
der: is the situation as it was in Iraq 2003? Europe 1944? Cuba 1898? the Boer wars? Ja-
pan in the Sixteenth century? China in the “warring states” period? The article also 
speaks of “Orwellian distortions of truth” without mentioning that at least one MBI 
proclaims that its underlying philosophy has “no place for reality and truth” (Barnes-
Holmes). 
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 Unfortunately, in my experience the above issues seem to be ra-
ther symptomatic of the mindfulness community: For one, there is an 
often lopsided, clearly dogmatic view of societal matters even when a bit 
of open-minded consideration would show that things are not as clear 
cut as one might be tempted to believe (e.g., Brexit: compare the discus-
sion above), despite a deeply ingrained self-image of being open-minded 
and flexible. Equally dogmatic seems to be the tendency among some in 
the community to use religion to criticize scientifically proven therapies: 
Priests thankfully learned to stop interfering in astronomy; why would 
monks (and others) think they should interfere in clinical psychology? 
Please note: I do not deny that the observations of monks and other 
meditators may contain valuable information about the workings of the 
human mind. But then, the observations of priests and astrologers were 
important input in the development of scientific astronomy as well; 
from this one can not conclude that astrologers and priests should have 
a say in how to conduct astronomy, nor that religion should dictate how 
to conduct psychology, medicine and/or psychotherapy.  
 
1.2 Overview 
If the above observations are anywhere near how things really are, there 
is an urgent need to study the relationship of dogmatism (and in particu-
lar ethical dogmatism) with mindfulness and Buddhism. This is of course 
a huge endavour, in this article I will mainly concentrate on the psycho-
logical angle. I show that a number of results from psychological science 
suggest the need to exercise increased humility in regard to our current 
ability to “see things as they really are” or for “pure awareness,” and 
thus more restraint in the urge to meddle in others decisions. I will also 
briefly sketch why I believe that ancient wisdom suggests the same. This 
humility seems to be missing (see examples above and in sections 3, 6.1), 
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both in (some? many? most?) traditional Buddhists and in (most, as far 
as I can tell) secular mindfulness practitioners. 
 Here is an outline of the argument for more humility from the 
point of view of science: 
1. There are serious limitations in the human capacity to see and 
acknowledge reality (section 2.1), including negativity bias, 
groupthink, bias blind spot, and many more.  
2. Perceived or real expertise does not cure that (section 2.2). 
3. The feeling of “doing the right thing” seems more apt to lead 
to overconfidence in one’s judgements and opinions than to 
seeing things as they really are (section 3).  
4. Feeling certain is an unreliable guide too, in particular in eth-
ical matters (sections 4.1&4.2). Also, the existence of expertise 
in ethics is at least doubtful (section 4.3). 
5. I take it for granted that if I have an impaired ability to “see 
things as they really are” then I should restrain my urges to 
tell others how to behave. Discussing this would be beyond 
the scope of this article,4 but compare the remarks on group 
think and the importance of independence in section 2.1. 
From the point of view of ancient wisdom this is because: 
1. “Those trained in Buddhist practices seem to be human as 
well [...] Buddhism as practiced and institutionalized over the 
centuries is no miracle cure for human ills [...] reference to 
Buddhist teachings alone is not suitable for claiming the mor-
al high ground” (section 2.3). 
                                               
4 So are philosophical topics like self-other asymmetry and the justify-require distinc-
tion; and psychological topics like self-determination theory and no(t)-self vs. morality. 
238 Mattes, On the Psychology of Mindfulness Dogmatism 
 
2. It is highly doubtful that anyone knows with any certainty 
what the Buddha really said (section 5.1, see also section 4 on 
certainty). 
3. Even if we assume the Pali Canon to be more or less the Bud-
dha’s word, it seems to be more about practicalities than what 
a society steeped in Christian “original sin” ideology means 
by ethics and morality.5 The Atthakavagga and possible con-
nections to Pyrrhonism also suggest that dogmatic morality is 
not native to Buddhism (section 5.2). 
4. There seems to be a permanent craving to “save the world” 
widely spread in supposedly secular mindfulness circles (and 
the rest of our society, including many of those who consider 
themselves Buddhists) likely due to Christian cognitive disso-
nance (section 5.3). Craving (compulsion, thirst, etc.) is of 
course antithetical to Buddhism and mindfulness (section 6.3). 
5. Given these points, compassion and proper humility should 
let us “direct our sympathy and support to those who face di-
lemmas, convince us not to reproach those whose chosen res-
olution differs from our own” (section 6.2) 
 
1.3 Method  
The point mentioned above concerning Christian cognitive dissonance 
already points to the fact that the issue here is more than just a few ar-
guments in favor or against some mere opinion in a discussion. Rather, 
                                               
5 Lee (3), in the context of a discussion of ethics and Zhuangzi’s Daoism, also notes ‘the 
myopic ways in which contemporary scholars, particularly those influenced by the 
global West, tend to understand “morality” as a system of obligations.’ I would add that 
it is not only scholars who have a parochial view of morality. Cf. Moeller, chapter 1. 
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the underlying problem seems to be one of mindset. Beyond providing 
an introduction to relevant aspects of the psychology of judgement and 
decision making (a branch of science important to, but widely neglected 
in, discussions related to mindfulness), this article tries to make this un-
derlying dogmatic mindset salient. In other words, this article is largely 
about what might be called the terms of the debate around mindfulness 
and ethics, rather than particular arguments. In view of this, I hesitate to 
discuss specific arguments (an exception is a discussion of the widely 
used “sniper example” in section 6.1). I do, nevertheless, freely and con-
sciously use what seem to me the most illuminating and important ex-
amples from history, even if some of these might “rile” a number of 
readers, as a reviewer put it – not least because the incoherence between 
self-perceived mindfulness and ethics on the one hand, and dogmatic 
reaction to unwelcome relevant information on the other, is part of what 
this article wants to make salient.  
 In addition, the goal to make the unrecognized underlying mindset 
visible also necessitates a writing style that is, in parts, somewhat less 
restrained than academic writing usually is. An unfortunate side effect is 
that the observations in this article are sometimes mistaken as personal 
criticisms, according to feedback on earlier drafts. Of course, in the pub-
lic perception, mindfulness is closely identified with certain people. 
Nevertheless, whatever critical remarks are presented here are about 
mindsets and opinions, not the people who hold them.6  
 
2. Intuition  
2.1 Errare humanum est (to err is human) 
                                               
6 In the spirit of distinguishing between acts and the persons who perform them, as it is 
central to Person-centered Therapy, and the concept of defusion (here between other 
persons and their opinions) from Acceptance and Commitment Therapy.  
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An ancient Egyptian papyrus contains some medical observations that 
clearly surprised its author: Why would a head wound interfere with a 
person’s walking? Why would another head wound let a person lose con-
sciousness of his arms and let his phallus be erect? (Changeux 3). Today’s 
readers of course know how important the brain is in organizing the 
body, but this papyrus can remind us how non-obvious this fact is. Even 
today we speak of “heart and head” when we really mean something like 
“limbic system and pre-frontal cortex”: it seems intuitive that emotions 
“sit” in the heart, because that is what we feel pounding when we get 
excited. Very intuitive, but misleading. 
 Would you notice if you rotated at 1000 kph? Well, where I am sit-
ting (latitude 48°) the earth rotates at approximately that speed. Our 
perception is that we are still; that the earth is rotating fast is entirely 
counter-intuitive. Many other examples could be given for the failures of 
human intuition (Taleb). Intuitive physics and probability are areas in 
which human intuition tends to perform badly, but they are not the only 
ones by far. On the other hand, many things we do very well intuitively, 
from recognizing faces to driving a car (once we have practiced it suffi-
ciently), as pointed out by Gigerenzer and others.  
 For which tasks is our intuition well-suited? Likely for those where 
during our evolution it was important that they be performed accurately 
(rather than, for instance, being performed safely) and those that were 
often repeated with timely and unambiguous feedback (Hogarth). How-
ever, in many ways our intuitions lead us systematically away from “see-
ing things as they really are” (which Buddhists claim is part of their 
path). In many cases this is because intuitive errors can be adaptive (for 
example, erring on the side of physical safety at the cost of missed op-
portunities can be advantageous), and likely were so, at least under the 
evolutionary conditions of the distant past (see Scheibehenne et al. for 
Journal of Buddhist Ethics 241 
 
 
the case of biased probability estimates). Often, then, our intuitions dis-
tort our view. 
 There is a vast psychological literature related to the precise defi-
nition of intuition, dual processing models, heuristics, and biases, and so 
forth, which cannot be fully reviewed here.7 Here I will briefly sketch a 
small selection of biases that will be important in the following, and a 
few related topics.  
  Cognitive dissonance. In a famous episode in the history of psycholo-
gy, researchers observed a secretive group that believed it had received 
messages from a faraway planet heralding the end of the world on 21 De-
cember 1955. The group believed that shortly before this date, a space-
ship would come and take them away to safety on that planet. The group 
assembled on the evening before; the UFO did not come and the world 
did not end. But neither did the belief! Not only did some in the group 
persist in their belief, the formerly secretive group started proselytizing. 
This was the starting point and paradigmatic example for the theory of 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger et al.; Cooper). 
  Pseudoscience. The group in the previous example managed to con-
vince themselves that the failure of the yearned-for UFO to appear did 
not disprove their belief. Rather, they rationalized that their faith and 
dedication made God spare earth from destruction. For those wedded to 
a certain belief there is almost always a way to avoid acknowledging its 
refutation. Indeed, many belief systems are self-validating in the sense 
that they have in-built mechanisms that help to deflect whatever con-
tradictions might appear (Boudry and Braeckman). For example, if one’s 
belief system includes the idea that any criticism of one’s beliefs arises 
                                               
7 For overviews and discussions see for example, Kahneman; Pohl; Evans and Stanovich; 
Shah and Oppenheimer. 
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from the unconscious personal motives of the critics, it is easy to avoid 
facing inconvenient facts.8 
  Saliency, base rate neglect, selection biases. The world is a complicated 
place and we cannot attend to all potentially relevant information. The 
result is that information that attracts attention, sticks out, is special, 
and is salient, has an undue influence on us. Similarly, we think we are 
special: it will not happen to us, we do not make that mistake, this time is 
different, etc. And indeed, in some ways each of us is special, and in some 
(rare) cases things really are different—but much less often than we feel. 
Similar biases are selection biases, like the survivor bias. A classic exam-
ple of the latter was displayed by the friend in the following story re-
ported by the Roman philosopher-politician Cicero: 
Diagoras, who is called the atheist, being at Samothrace, 
one of his friends showed him several pictures of people 
who had endured very dangerous storms; “See,” says he, 
“you who deny a providence, how many have been saved 
by their prayers to the Gods.” “Ay,” says Diagoras, “I see 
those who were saved, but where are those painted who 
were shipwrecked?” (http://thriceholy.net/Texts/Cicero3. 
html) 
 Group think. If our information processing and decision-making ca-
pacities are indeed limited, should we prefer collective decision making? 
Surowiecki gives many examples where groups did indeed make better 
decisions. However, some conditions are required for accurate collective 
decisions: every person involved needs to have at least a minimum of 
relevant knowledge; on average, opinions have to be unbiased and peo-
ple have to reason independently. The latter condition, in particular, is 
often violated. We are much too easily influenced or manipulated by 
                                               
8 Zimmer presents an impressive example. 
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others (see, for example, Cialdini; Levine; Bénabou; Szanto et al.). Even 
when we realize that a group is moving in the wrong direction, it often 
seems safer for us to go along rather than dissent. This was once suc-
cinctly and memorably expressed by the famous investor Warren Buffet: 
“Lemmings as a group have a rotten image, but no individual lemming 
ever got bad press.”9 It is also worth noting that group think can magnify 
the effects of other biases. If certain ideas or facts get more attention due 
to selection bias, the apparent agreement of others will instill even more 
confidence and reduce even more the chances of complementary or al-
ternative information getting accepted. Note that this downward spiral 
in collective cognition can work quite automatically, without any im-
proper intent. If, in all sincerity, someone holds a more popular opinion, 
this will tend to spread and be perceived as more credible simply be-
cause of popularity, independent of whatever merit that opinion may or 
may not have. (Hence, if you value truth, beware of agreement among 
your peers.)  
 Negativity bias. Another well-known bias is overemphasis of the 
negative. We pay more attention to negative than positive aspects of our 
experience (Baumeister et al.; Rozin and Royzman). Again, there may be 
evolutionary reasons; it may, at least in the short term, have been less 
important for our ancestors to find tasty food than it was to avoid be-
coming food for someone else. The potentially negative attracts more 
attention than opportunities. Even so, we tend to see things more bleak-
ly than they really are. Social transmission of information apparently 
contributes to this bias (Bebbington et al.). 
 Bias blind spot and overconfidence. Not only do we not realize the de-
ficiencies in our judgements and decisions, we also tend to be overconfi-
dent in them. Overconfidence may also be an evolutionary acquired trait 
                                               
9 Warren Buffett: Chairman's letter to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 
1984 edition. http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1984.html 
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(Johnson and Fowler). DeBondt and Thaler considered the possibility 
that people are overconfident to be “. . . perhaps the most robust finding 
in the psychology of judgment” (389). We tend to be blind to our own 
biases independently of cognitive ability (West et al.). No wonder Nassim 
Taleb spoke of the “epistemic arrogance” of humanity (17). 
 These serious limitations in the human capacity to acknowledge 
reality are nicely summarized in a quote from Daniel Kahneman who re-
fers to the human brain in intuitive processing mode as “a machine for 
jumping to conclusions” (79). 
 
2.2 Experts are human too 
To some extent, intuition is trainable. Nevertheless, expertise in general 
and expert intuition in particular have their limits. Just a few examples:  
 In a well-known in-depth study of the ability of political experts to 
forecast events, this ability turned out to be rather small and inversely 
related to experts’ self-confidence:  
. . . the best forecasters and timeliest belief updaters 
shared a self-deprecating style of thinking that spared 
them some of the big mistakes to which their more ideo-
logically exuberant colleagues were prone. There is often 
a curiously inverse relationship between how well fore-
casters thought they were doing and how well they did 
(Tetlock, xi).  
 Similar doubts as to at least some forms of perceived expertise are 
suggested by “the historical record of philosophical argumentation, 
which is a track record that is marked by an abundance of alternative 
theories and serious problems for those theories” (Mizrahi). This may be 
due to shortcomings in supposedly expert philosophical intuition (com-
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pare, for example, Nado or Buckwalter). Such shortcomings have been 
well documented in ethical “expert” evaluation of moral dilemmas in 
particular, where such irrelevant features as, for example, the order in 
information is presented, has considerable influence. 
 Stephen Greenspan, a well-known psychologist, published a book 
in 2008 entitled Annals of Gullibility in which he documented many cases 
of credulity and gave advice for how to avoid this. About a year later he 
lost a considerable part of his savings in the Madoff scam (Henriques). 
Freedman provides many more examples of expert errors. 
 Of particular interest here is the work of Schwitzgebel (“Perplexi-
ties”), which has shown problems with introspection even among spe-
cially trained psychologists. Finally, it bears mentioning that—certain 
popular memes not withstanding—expertise does not inoculate against 
overconfidence (for example, Atir et al.; Fisher and Keil). 
 
2.3 Sangha humanum est 
Those trained in Buddhist practices seem to be human as well. Even 
though there is some evidence that mindfulness practice improves deci-
sion making (for example, Hafenbrack et al), it seems far from clear 
which aspects of decision making are improved and to what extent. Ver-
haeghen showed that Buddhist practice improves judgment in important 
matters only to a limited extent and observed that introspection is an 
unreliable guide to self-knowledge even for meditators (at least as long 
as one does not have a “tremendous” amount of practice):  
. . . only the meditators with a tremendous amount of 
meditation experience succeeded in actually meditating 
with only minimal stirrings of a sense of self, although the 
less accomplished meditators were clearly convinced that 
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they succeeded in doing this as well . . . a finding that 
should inspire humility. (Verhaeghen 31)  
 In moral matters, things may be similar; in the Seventeenth centu-
ry, the fifth Dalai Lama declared a Mongolian ruler to be a Bodhisattva 
because that ruler had intervened militarily to preserve the Dalai Lama’s 
power (Damoser 17). Examples of Buddhist clergy who may not always 
show good judgment range from infighting among Tibetan Buddhists 
and the infamous Japanese warrior monks of Mount Hiei to certain pre-
sent day bigoted and belligerent monks in countries like Sri Lanka and 
Myanmar. In fact, Michael Jerryson wrote in the introduction to Buddhist 
Warfare, “Since the inception of Buddhist traditions 2,500 years ago, 
there have been numerous individual and structural cases of prolonged 
Buddhist violence” (3). 
 This, of course, need not mean that Buddhism itself is somehow 
deficient; it does not even preclude the possibility that Buddhists on av-
erage might behave better (whatever exactly that may mean) than oth-
ers. But it does show that Buddhism as practiced and institutionalized 
over the centuries is no miracle cure for human ills. In other words, ref-
erence to Buddhist teachings alone is not suitable for claiming the moral 
high ground (to the extent that there is such a thing in the first place). 
To put it even more bluntly: if indeed “. . . the scorn evident in some of 
the criticisms (of secular Mindfulness Based Interventions) is quite stun-
ning” (Harrington and Dunne), it seems to me that those showing such 
condescending arrogance towards whoever uses modern secular MBIs as 
scientifically proven ways to relieve very real and present suffering have 
a lot of explaining to do. 
 Humans tend to be error-prone in our judgments and decisions, 
and this holds also for various kinds of experts, including meditators and 
Buddhist monks. Nevertheless, this does not prevent us from frequently 
feeling certain about our judgments, and in particular about our moral 
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judgments. In the next two sections I consider this feeling of certainty 
from the psychological angle, then in section 5 with regard to Buddhist 
traditions.  
 
3. Righteousness  
People do not usually go around thinking: “I want to do something evil.” 
Even in the most extreme cases, at least many of those involved believe 
they are doing good:  
Stalin and Hitler both claimed throughout their political 
careers to be victims. They persuaded millions of other 
people that they, too, were victims: of an international 
capitalist or Jewish conspiracy. . . . No major war or act of 
mass killing in the twentieth century began without the 
aggressors or perpetrators first claiming innocence and 
victimhood. (Snyder 399) 
As the historian Claudia Koonz put it: “The road to Auschwitz was paved 
with righteousness.” Moeller notes that “Actions performed self-
righteously always feel right to the self that performs them. People 
commit genocide not because they believe that it is immoral, but for the 
exact opposite reason” (31). 
 Pointing out that even Nazis often subjectively thought to do “the 
right thing” easily elicits a gut reaction of “impossible.” That this is just 
another example of human intuition failure is attested by the fact that 
this gut reaction is very often absent in the context of others of the great 
crimes of recent history, for example by communists. After all,  
Stalin’s own record of mass murder was almost as impos-
ing as Hitler’s. . . . Stalin knew what would happen when 
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he seized food from the starving peasants of Ukraine in 
1933, just as Hitler knew what could be expected when he 
deprived Soviet prisoners of war of food eight years later. 
In both cases, more than three million people died. The 
hundreds of thousands of Soviet peasants and workers 
shot during the Great Terror of 1937 were victims of ex-
press directives of Stalin, just as the millions of Jews shot 
and gassed between 1941 and 1945 were victims of an ex-
plicit policy by Hitler. (Snyder iv)  
Nor is it true that Stalin perverted a morally sound legacy of Lenin’s 
(Gellately), as is sometimes claimed, nor is it an isolated case in the his-
tory of communism; think of North Korea, China, the unbelievable bru-
tality of Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, or the Maoist Sendero Luminoso ter-
rorists in Peru, not to mention the mass executions after the Cuban revo-
lution, the murderous rampages of the Brigate Rosse in Italy, the Mon-
toneros in Buenos Aires, the Rote Armee Fraktion in Germany, or the 
Japanese Red Army. 
 Recently I noticed that a student group in my hometown intends 
to celebrate the 100-year anniversary of the communist “October Revo-
lution.” Celebrating a century of Gulag, intentional mass starvation, mass 
shootings and abuse of psychiatry for political purposes, parts of aca-
demia manage to make Mr. Trump look almost reasonable by compari-
son.10 That raises the question: why do those who claim to promote and 
who try to embody mindfulness, wisdom, and compassion seem to 
choose their bad examples always from one part of the political land-
scape? Why did a world famous mindfulness teacher in a seminar I at-
tended laud the recent economic progress of China (rightly so), stressing 
                                               
10 So, I implicitly do comment on Mr. Trump, after all. By the way, when you read my 
statement above in which I said that I would not comment on him, did your brain jump 
to any conclusions regarding what my attitude towards him might be? 
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that this was under communist rule, but neglect to mention the millions 
who slowly starved to a gruesome death in Mao’s Great Famine (Jisheng) 
or that China’s impressive recent progress in fighting poverty is the re-
sult of Deng’s pro-market economic reforms? To me it seems that the 
warm glow of “doing the (apparently) right thing” is in such cases 
trumping the tender shoots of openness and balance that mindfulness is 
meant to nourish—even for someone smart and well-trained and with 
the best intentions. 
 
4. Certainty  
4.1 Certainty about our motives?  
In the film “The Devil’s Advocate,” Keanu Reeves played a lawyer work-
ing for the devil (Al Pacino). When the lawyer started to have second 
thoughts about the work he was doing, the devil convinced him to con-
tinue by reminding him of all the good he could later do with the fruits 
of his labor. After the lawyer left the scene the devil turned to the cam-
era and declared: “Vanity: my favorite sin!”  
 Research has come up with convincing evidence that much human 
behavior is characterized by moral hypocrisy (Batson), that people most-
ly tend to prefer feeling moral to acting morally (Gino et al.), that they are 
self-righteous (Klein and Epley), that beliefs adjust to moral evaluations 
rather than the other way around (Liu and Ditto), and that supposedly 
altruistic punishment of transgressors serves self-interest (Krasnowet 
al.). 
 But surely not us? Remember the discussion of base rate neglect 
above: if, in controlled experiments, eighty percent of people display 
hypocrisy, how sure can you be that you are among the small minority 
who does not? 
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4.2 Certainty about consequences?  
Ill-founded certainty is a danger as well when it comes to forecasting the 
consequences of different courses of action. We have seen above that 
even expert political forecasters are far from making reliable forecasts. 
Another well-known example is how well-intended attempts to prevent 
wildfires in national parks led to fewer but much more severe outbreaks. 
 Even decisions that seem obviously correct can have unintended 
outcomes. What could be more obviously positive than donating for the 
victims of civil war? Polman explains how this had severe negative con-
sequences in cases where local war lords realized that more images of 
suffering in worldwide media mean more aid money—aid that, at least 
part of which, can be redirected into their own pockets.11  
 
4.3 Certainty delegated: moral expertise?  
Perhaps experts, even if they cannot reliably forecast the consequences 
of actions in complex situations, or keep irrelevant features of moral di-
lemmas out of consideration (see above), might at least be better, less 
prone to hypocrisy, for example, at everyday moral behavior? Alas, it 
seems not to be the case. Eric Schwitzgebel, in a series of publications, 
studied the behavior of moral philosophers. For example, he analyzed 
data from the university library and found that books concerning ethics 
had a fifty percent higher(!) probability of disappearing from the library 
than other scholarly literature (“Ethicists”). Later studies, for example 
involving payment of conference fees, again suggested that intensive 
professional preoccupation with ethics and morality leads to behavior 
that is at best at par with that of other people. 
                                               
11 See also Nunn and Qian. 




 5. Buddhism 
Here is a brief summary up to this point: Modern mindfulness interven-
tions have been rigorously proven to alleviate suffering, nevertheless, 
they have been criticized on supposedly moral grounds. In the previous 
sections I argued that psychology provides good reasons to doubt such 
moral judgments, even when they are accompanied by feelings of cer-
tainty and/or come from presumed experts in morality. In the present 
section I will sketch some considerations which make it appear doubtful 
that the teachings of the Buddha can be used to provide a firm basis for 
these criticisms of MBIs.  
 I hope no one misinterprets the following observations as a dispar-
agement of the Buddha, the Dharma, or the Saṅgha (or anyone else for 
that matter); but just in case, I want to recall the words attributed to the 
Buddha in the very first sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya:  
‘Monks, if anyone should speak in disparagement of me, of 
the Dhamma or of the Sangha, you should not be angry, 
resentful or upset on that account. . . . For if . . . you are 
angry or displeased, can you recognise whether what they 
say is right or not?’ ‘No, Lord’ (Brahmājāla Sutta DN 1, 
translated by Walshe).12 
 
5.1 Original teachings of the Buddha?  
A relevant point in regard to the article mentioned in the introduction is 
that it referred to the original teachings of the Buddha (Kabat-Zinn 1125). 
Many others also explicitly or (usually) implicitly claim that their beliefs 
                                               
12 All following quotations from the Dīgha Nikāya are from this translation. 
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derive authority from these original teachings. I am wondering how they 
can know what these were. After all, I find it exceedingly improbable 
when it is reported about the Buddha that “. . . on the soles of his feet are 
wheels with a thousand spokes” (Mahāpadāna Sutta, DN 14.1.22); that in 
the past, people had a life-span of 80000 years (DN 14.1.7); that he had 
the “miracle of psychic power [and] telepathy” (Kevaddha Sutta, DN 11.3); 
or, that with “the divine ear, purified and surpassing that of human be-
ings, he hears sounds both divine and human” (Samaññaphala Sutta, DN 
2.89). Clearly, at least considerable parts of the suttas cannot be taken 
literally. Even taking the optimistic point of view that such examples of 
supernatural beliefs might not be part of the Buddha’s original teachings 
but are later additions, one may wonder what else was added, and 
what—if anything—is original teaching. 
 It would seem to be a difficult task to extract the original teaching 
from the sources given that there apparently is not even agreement 
among the experts whether the picture painted by the suttas is broadly 
consistent with the archaeological record (Sujato and Brahmali) or not 
(Beckwith). Further, different branches of Buddhism apparently disagree 
on quite substantial matters. Anattā seems pretty central to Buddhism, so 
the question of whether there is any kind of substantial self does not 
sound irrelevant (Harvey 93); nor is the question of whether liberating 
insight is part of the original teaching (Bronkhorst). Or take duality: 
“Bhikkhu Bodhi . . . holds that the acceptance of the concept of nonduali-
ty by Mahayana Buddhisms is incompatible with Theravada Buddhism’s 
framework that derives the rationale for ardent practice from the duali-
ty of samsara (the repeating cycle of rebirth) and Nibbana (the extin-
guishing of ill will, greed, and delusion)” (Monteiro et al.). Additional ex-
amples include whether there is subtle pride in Arhats, whether Arhats 
develop further, and whether Bodhisattvas can fall back to the supposed-
ly lesser goal of Arhatship (Harvey 93). 
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 Yet another issue is the fact that the teaching was first transmitted 
exclusively orally. It is sometimes argued that memory was much better 
in cultures without writing—maybe so, but a canon of suttas which 
amounts to thousands of printed pages? Not to mention the feat of re-
calling all these teachings after the Buddha’s death was supposedly per-
formed by a single person, Ānanda (Gombrich 100). It is not reassuring 
that the same Ānanda was faulted by the Buddha for having repeatedly 
missed “a broad hint, such a clear sign” that the Buddha intended to 
soon enter parinibbāna, (Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, DN 16.3.40) and that he 
misunderstood the doctrine of dependent origination (Mahanidāna Sutta, 
DN 15.1). Nor can I follow claims that the Sangha always tried to preserve 
the core of the teaching verbatim (Gombrich 102), given that this did not 
seem to apply in later periods13. Similarly, Anālayo reports that already 
right after the Buddha’s death, at the very first recitation of the suttas, “a 
central concern” was “to affirm communal harmony”; so, one may won-
der to what extent the result represents a faithful rendering of the Bud-
dha’s original teachings. 
 Another point which worries me is the discrepancies between ver-
sions of canonical texts and our ability to properly understand them in the 
first place. After all, research brought to light “literally thousands of dif-
ferences between versions” (Gombrich 98). Yet, Gombrich continues “. . . 
but I have yet to see another version of a Pali text which makes me in-
terpret it differently.” What bothers me is that Gombrich also seems to 
say that a simple and perfectly reasonable change in the translation of a 
single word (reading an ablative where “. . . all previous translators took 
the word . . . as a dative”) led to a wholesale reinterpretation of an im-
portant point in the Ṛg Veda (Gombrich 32). Could alternative readings 
also have been overlooked in the Buddhist texts, despite all the ingenui-
ty and hard work that went into translation and interpretation? Could 
                                               
13 For example, in early Chan Buddhism, see Yampolsky. 
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there be a certain amount of group think in translations? Even if one 
thinks it appropriate to use traditional religious texts to judge clinically 
proven MBIs, how certain can one be of the true meaning of those texts? 
Even when all (existing, or maybe even all recorded) traditions 
agree on a point (for example, the eightfold path) there is still a problem 
with concluding that it is likely part of the original teaching: this conclu-
sion would only be justified if the probability of transmission of a part of 
the teaching were independent of its content. Hypothetically, for in-
stance, assume that the original teaching of the Buddha stressed the im-
portance of a solitary and inconvenient life style. Further suppose that 
later interpretations deny this, consequently being relatively more pop-
ular with the laity. The latter would have a higher probability of con-
tinuing existence in circumstances such as the persecutions under the 
late Tang dynasty (Harvey 223), even though they lead away from the 
original teaching.14 
 There is already a huge literature pointing out inconsistencies and 
other problems with the traditional texts. I am not trying to add any-
thing original to this (I am nowhere near knowledgeable enough to do 
that). Rather, my point is that even a cursory reading shows the burden 
of proof to be on those claiming to represent the original teachings of 
the Buddha15: how sure can you be that you indeed do? What exactly is 
your confidence based on? 
 
                                               
14 Schopen (28) gives another argument of why uniformity of a teaching across tradi-
tions does not prove that this teaching goes back to the Buddha.  
15 Of course, even if present day teachings were far away from the original, they and the 
Sangha would still serve valuable purposes like preserving whatever truly original 
teaching might be buried in the traditions, catering to people’s emotional and spiritual 
needs, motivating at least some to go on their own spiritual quest, and so on. This is 
unrelated to the topic of this article, the psychology of mindfulness dogmatism. 
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5.2 Inferior matters  
In the previous subsection I argued that at least considerable parts of the 
Pali canon cannot be taken at face value. I also argued that whoever 
claims to derive moral authority from representing the original teach-
ings of the Buddha owns us both a clear statement regarding which 
teachings they refer to and proof that these specific teachings were real-
ly taught by the Buddha.  
 Nevertheless, some insist that the whole Pali canon indeed faith-
fully represents the original teachings. But even in this case there seem 
reasons to doubt that the Buddha would prefer supposed moral truths to 
the proven relief of suffering which MBIs provide. After all, we read him 
talking about “elementary, inferior matters for which the worldling 
would praise” the Tathāgata—and these “inferior matters” are matters of 
moral conduct (DN 1.1.27): from refraining from killing (DN 1.1.8) to not 
eating at night (Brahmajāla Sutta DN 1). 
 Moreover, the Dīgha Nikāya provides two more observations which 
point to the same conclusion. First, the Buddha recommends morality to 
lay people first of all as a means to obtain wealth. “Five advantages to 
one of good morality and of success in morality. What are they? In the 
first place, through careful attention to his affairs he gains much wealth” 
(Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, DN 16.1.24). Second, the Ambaṭṭha Sutta (DN 3.1.20) 
tells us that in a discussion, the Buddha seemed to threaten his interloc-
utor stating “If you don’t answer, or evade the issue, if you keep silent or 
go away, your head will split into seven pieces.” 
 Finally, it is worth noting that right after the death of the Buddha 
there was already disagreement as to which rules for bhikkhus could (or 
maybe should) be abolished, a question which is “not a light matter” 
(Anālayo, 3). Anālayo continues by remarking on the “danger of mistak-
ing the means of moral conduct for being the goal” and reminds us that 
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Needless to say, the main task to be accomplished from 
the normative viewpoint of early Buddhist thought is 
awakening. . . . Reaching the first level of awakening in 
turn entails precisely the overcoming of the fetter of 
dogmatic adherence to rules and observances (Anālayo, 6). 
 
5.3 The end is nigh, as usual  
Deja-vu all over again: the end of the world is near, as it has seemed 
countless times before. From the apocalyptic visions of John through 
various other esoteric prophecies like those of Nostradamus or “scientif-
ically proven” disasters like Peak Oil or Waldsterben in the recent past, 
there seems to be a permanent feeling that the end of the world is near 
and “we” need to save it. 
 In a fascinating new book, German historian Johannes Fried recalls 
that early Christians expected Judgment Day to come within the near 
future. Fried argues that the failure of the world to end led them to the 
belief that their own virtuous behavior had moved God to postpone the 
day of reckoning,16 and their missionary zeal increased despite the dis-
confirmation of their belief.17 (parallels to the previous story concerning 
cognitive dissonance are striking). This in turn has caused a permanent 
                                               
16  S.26: “Die Christen erkannten in Jesus von Nazareth den Messisas, der seine 
Wiederkehr für Herrschaft und Gericht für ‘bald’ angekündigt hatte.[...] Als er nicht 
kam, mußte seine Botschaft umgedeutet werden.” 
17 S.27: “So missionierten die Christen gerade, als sich die Wiederkehr des Herrn ver-
zögerte [. . .] ihre immer neu zu aktualisierende Erwartungs- und Untergangsbotschaft 
[. . .].” 
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craving to “save the world” to become deeply ingrained in “Western” 
culture, whether Christian or secular.18  
 Given that modern Buddhism is heavily influenced by “Western” 
culture (Sharf), that could be another indication that excessive moraliz-
ing is not native to Buddhism; insofar as such tendencies appear in con-
temporary Buddhism, they might very well be imports, at least in part. 
Others have expressed similar views: “critics have cynically nicknamed 
the mainstream introduction of secular mindfulness as ‘McMindfulness’; 
however, this perspective may be a distinctly Westernized view” (Mur-
phy). Furthermore, “The larger clinical and religious community, how-
ever, has not always been troubled by the idea that meditation might 
sometimes be used as a highly pragmatic remedy for various ailments. 
Why, then, are people troubled now?” (Harrington and Dunne). 
 Finally, if Beckwith is right at least in so far that the comparison 
with Greek skeptical philosophy in the tradition of Pyrrho of Elis can tell 
us something about early Buddhism,19 the absence of excessive moraliz-
ing in skeptical philosophy and its emphasis on withholding judgments 
                                               
18 S.13f: “Dem Untergang sind wir nicht entronnen. Seine Erwartung ist nicht erledigt. 
Die Menschheit ist nicht von Angst befreit. Das Weltende bleibt präsent, jedenfalls im 
‘Westen’. [...] Es droht und wühlt im kulturellen Gedächtnis, scheint zum Handeln zu 
zwingen und führt, so steht es zu befürchten, durch Angstreaktionen reale Untergänge 
herauf.” 
 S.24f: “Gottgefälliges Tun hielt den Untergang auf [. . .] Die Erwartung des Un-
tergangs überdauerte die Zeiten und mit ihr der Wille zur Weltrettung. [. . .] Der Wel-
tuntergang bedurfte gelehrter Pflege; er blieb sich dabei nicht gleich. [. . .] Säkularis-
ierende, sich aus den Glaubenshorizonten entfernende Umformungen konnten 
hervortreten [. . .].” 
 S.35: “Die Endzeit verflüchtigte sich tatsächlich nicht mit der Wissenschaft. Der 
Weltuntergang findet auch für sie statt; die Prognostik streift sich lediglich andere, 
eben naturwissenschaftlich und kosmologisch gefärbte Kleider über.” 
19 This would also be consistent with the otherwise highly critical review of Beckwith’s 
book Greek Buddha by Batchelor; see his discussion on p. 202ff. 
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would yet again point to the same being true of the original teachings of 
the Buddha. 
 To avoid misunderstandings, please note what I am not saying here:  
1. I am not denying that there are serious problems in the world. I 
am talking about the appropriateness and skillfulness of our emo-
tional reactions. An Aikido Sensei once said, “Just because you are 
paranoid, that does not mean they are not after you.” True, but it 
is still better not to be paranoid20 if you want to handle the situa-
tion skillfully. Self-overconfident morality which seems driven 
largely by gut feelings, group think, cognitive dissonance, sali-
ence and negativity bias, and other distortions, may instill the 
warm glow of perceived righteousness, but has otherwise little to 
recommend it. 
2. Nor am I claiming that the culturally ingrained cognitive disso-
nance of early Christianity is the only source of apocalyptic ideas. 
But even if similar looking ideas may have arisen in Buddhism in-
dependently (Jerryson and Juergensmeyer, 8), it still makes a big 
difference whether your underlying outlook is basically cyclical, 
involving repeated rebirth, or a once-and-for-all decision by an 
omnipotent god in the immediate future. Also, there may be addi-
tional important contributors to an overemphasis on risk and 
negativity in globalized “Western” culture. A natural candidate 
would be the aging of society, given that older people tend to be 
more risk averse. 
 
                                               
20 Apologists of paranoid cognition will of course deny this and claim that, on the con-
trary, paranoia is actually indispensable as it supposedly makes you vigilant, energizes, 
is necessary for collective action, etc. 
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6. Conclusion  
6.1 Too early to tell, indeed 
Both in the literature and in informal conversation, “. . . the example of 
the sniper is often used to show how bare attention in itself cannot be 
called mindfulness as the outcome of this type of attention has unwhole-
some results (that is, killing someone and therefore violating a primary 
ethic to do no harm)” (Monteiro et al.). Let us look at a few examples:  
 On May 27, 1942, snipers in Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia shot and 
fatally wounded SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, head of the 
Nazi security office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt).21 Would it really be an 
obvious good if their attention had been less well trained? Is it truly ob-
vious that the world would be a better place if they had tried but missed 
their target, maybe because they were not mindful enough? Would that 
have been a “wholesome result?” What if instead someone had split 
Heydrich’s head?22  
 Suppose in the 1930s a well-trained sniper—a former Shaolin war-
rior monk, maybe—had managed to kill Mao Zedong, thereby possibly 
not only sparing Tibetan Buddhists a lot of distress, but also preventing 
the atrocities of the so-called “Cultural Revolution” and the mass starva-
tions of the Great Famine, which caused dozens of millions of agonized 
deaths (Jisheng). How sure can you be that this would have been, every-
thing considered, an unwholesome result? 
 
                                               
21 In reality, an attempt at shooting him in an ambush failed; it was a bomb thrown at 
his car that fatally wounded him. The difference is irrelevant in the present context. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reinhard_Heydrich  
22 Compare above DN 3.1.20 
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6.2 Compassion 
Blanket dismissal of teaching mindfulness in certain contexts looks itself 
rather dubious. Repetti also stressed the importance of context with re-
spect to the sniper example. To me it suggests a serious amount of over-
confidence in judgment, likely both in regard to “true morality” and to 
the ability to foresee consequences. Beyond that, dictating to others how 
they should make moral decisions might be an expression of another bi-
as—the general human tendency to interfere in others’ lives,23 which one 
might well call “moralizing addiction.”24 Would it not be more in line 
both with modern mindfulness and with traditional Buddhism to com-
passionately “direct our sympathy and support to those who face di-
lemmas, convince us not to reproach those whose chosen resolution dif-
fers from our own” (Cushman and Young)? 
 
6.3 Wisdom 
“I know that I know nothing” is widely admired as an expression of wis-
dom. Pyrrho—and I believe the Buddha—would have added: “I’m not 
even sure about that.”25 Psychological research reviewed above confirms 
that our judgments are highly fallible,26 including in ethical matters, 
even when we feel certain. 
                                               
23 “Meddlesomeness” Kuran (23) 
24 In parallel with “ontological addiction” of Shonin et al. 
25 After all, both seemed concerned with the pragmatic question of how to live life, ra-
ther than with metaphysical or ethical “truths,” (compare Batchelor After Buddhism 
chapter 5) let alone with some supposedly universal morality which they would then 
dictate to others. 
26 However, as mentioned earlier, where helpful for evolutionary success, intuition is 
likely to be accurate, on average. Also, the scientific method goes some way to reduce 
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And yet, we cannot simply deny that we often wish things to be 
different, that life seems in some important way unsatisfactory (duk-
kha).27 According to the Buddhist tradition the root causes of this, as ex-
pressed in the second noble truth, are taṇhā (thirst, craving) and upādāna 
(clinging); both point to something like inner compulsion as the underly-
ing problem.28 The goal, and in particular the purpose of mindfulness 
practice, then would be liberation from such inner compulsion. However, 
overconfident moralizing seems to be among the most treatment-
resistant forms of inner compulsion. 
 The message of this article in a nutshell: More mindfulness of our 
human cognitive limitations should lead to less dogmatism in general, and in 
ethical matters in particular. 
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